Until 1962, according
to the Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique, there
had been a total of 19 Ecumenical Councils in the history
of the Catholic Church. Denzinger adds the Council
of Constance (1414), bringing the total up to 20. Should
Vatican II be counted as an Ecumenical Council with these
others?
The Dictionnaire
de Théologie Catholique defines an Ecumenical
(or Universal) Council as
the solemn assembly
of the bishops of the entire world, summoned by and under
the authority and presidency of the Roman Pontiff, to
deliberate and legislate together on matters concerning
the whole of Christendom.
Preferable, perhaps,
is the definition put forward by Rahner's Theological
Dictionary, which brings out more clearly the external
criteria for regularity:
Councils (or synods)
are assemblies composed first and foremost of Bishops
[an allusion to Councils in the past, in which Princes
and Christian Sovereigns participated-Ed.]; these
assemblies are held to discuss the Church's affairs,
to take decisions and promulgate decrees....An assembly
of the representatives of the whole Church, convoked in
a regular manner (convoked, directed and confirmed by
the Pope), is called an Ecumenical Council. According
to Catholic doctrine and Canon Law [1977 Code of Canon
Law, can. 228] the Bishops who, assembled in an Ecumenical
Council, deliberate and take decisions with the Pope and
under his direction, exercise supreme power in the Church;
further-more, when the Council adopts a solemn definition,
they enjoy infallibility in a matter of Faith. This also
applies when they exercise the ordinary Magisterium of
the Church and make it known on a global scale.
For an Ecumenical
Council to exist, therefore, the conditions are as follows:
it must be called by the Pope; its work must be directed
by the Pope (in person or by persons delegated by him);
and its acts must be confirmed by the Pope. Such confirmation
may be antecedent (when the Pope imposes his directives
in advance) or concomitant (when he participates in the
Council's work) or subsequent (when he ratifies the Council's
acts by a final, definitive approval). It is the papal confirmation
which gives the Council's decisions universal juridical
value [7577 Code of Canon Law, can.227]. These are
the external criteria for the regularity and existence
of a Council. Clearly, we must add to these three external
criteria an internal criterion, namely the matter
dealt with, which is necessarily limited to affairs of the
Church, i.e., to things which concern faith and morals
and are intimately connected with them. All other matters
which do not fall within the Church's competence must be
excluded. (This latter is self-evident, which is why certain
theological treatises do not even mention it.)
Regularity
Is Not Infallibility
The fact that an
Ecumenical Council exhibits the exterior marks of being
formally regular does not imply, all the same, that its
declarations enjoy the guarantee of infallibility and are
to be imposed as such on the faith and acceptance of the
Faithful. Ecumenicity must not be confused with infallibility.
This brings us face
to face with the complex and sometimes difficult question
(even for theologians) of the doctrinal value of a Council's
decisions, for it is on this value that the due assent of
the faithful depends. Three theological principles should
be taken into consideration (cf. Dictionnaire de Théologie
Catholique, vol.V, "Concile," col. 666):
1)
Most importantly, a definition's scope
and meaning is measured by the intention of the author;
accordingly it is of prime importance to examine this intention.
2)
Furthermore, with regard to a particular
truth, the Church can teach it as "of faith,"
or only as "certain," "common," "probable,"
etc.; in the same way, an error can be condemned
as "heretical," but also as merely "erroneous,"
"rash," or by using some other, lesser, theological
censure. In all these cases, the definitive judgment of
the supreme authority is infallible and demands absolute
assent on the part of the faithful, but it does not compel
them in the same way and tender the same penalties. For
example, if a truth is proposed as "of faith,"
it must be held to have been revealed by God, under pain
of heresy; if it is proposed as merely "certain,"
one must hold it as such under pain of sin. The condemnation
of a proposition as "heretical," is equivalent
to affirming that the contrary proposition is "of faith,"
but no other condemnation entails a similar equivalence.
3)
A third principle should not be lost
sight of: in every definition, it is the substance alone
which falls under the guarantee of the privilege of
infallibility.
Councils...and
The Second Vatican Council
It is not difficult
to apply these three principles to the 20 Councils which
preceded Vatican II, because all of them, with the exception
of the Fourth Ecumenical Council (the Council of Chalcedon
in 451) and the Thirteenth (Lyons in 1245), exhibit the
classic division into two parts: a doctrinal part, called
the "chapter," which sets forth the true Catholic
doctrine which is to be defended against attack, and the
second, defensive part, called the "canon," which
contains in a brief and condensed formula, the condemnation
of the opposite errors, accompanied by various sanctions:
anathema, condemnation, reprobation, attribution of heresy,
etc....as well as disciplinary sanctions as the case
may require.
As far as the external
criteria are concerned, the 20 Councils preceding Vatican
II are all "ecumenical" and regular in form; furthermore,
they all dealt with disciplinary or administrative questions
without going beyond the realm of Church affairs that are
proper to Christendom.
By contrast, when
one examines the documents of Vatican II in the light of
the theological principles here recalled, one is continually
amazed at what one finds.
The first
reason for amazement is the presence of hundreds
of "observers" representing practically all the
non-Catholic sects, who participated in the work of rejuvenating
the Church. Pope Pius IX, when convoking the First Vatican
Council, addressed an appeal to all Protestants and non-Catholics
in which he invited them (lam Vos Omnes, Sept. 13,
1868) to ask themselves whether they were following the
way prescribed by Our Lord Jesus Christ, exhorting them
to return to the Catholic Church to which "their ancestors
belonged," and to find there the "good pastures
of life." However, when the dissidents asked him if
they could present their arguments at the imminent Council,
Pius IX (Per Ephemerides Acceptimum, Sept. 4, 1869)
replied that "the Church cannot permit the continued
discussion of errors that have already been carefully examined,
judged and condemned." Then in another brief of October
30, 1869, the Pope granted the opportunity for Protestants
and Catholics to put forward their difficulties in a commission
of Catholic theologians, but outside the Council.
At Vatican II, by
contrast, the so-called "observers" (heretics
and schismatics) actively participated in the work of the
Council, indirectly or even directly, as one of them, R.
McAfee Brown, attests in his book Observer in Rome:1
Although we had
no direct "voice" on the Council floor, we did
indeed have an indirect voice through the many contacts
that were possible with the Fathers and their indispensable
strong right arms, the periti.
The same McAfee Brown
says that in the case of the schema on Ecumenism, the heretical
and schismatic "observers" submitted their points
of view in writing and these were incorporated into the
written interventions of some Bishops.2
So Vatican II was not an Ecumenical Council but, as one
might say, a "super-Ecumenical" Council. But was
it still Catholic?
The
second reason for
amazement: the volume of the Council documents. It is really
amazing to see that all the texts (constitutions, decrees,
declarations and messages) add up to no less than 1,012
pages in a volume an inch-and-a-half thick. Compare this
with Denzinger's, which contains all the definitions and
declarations on faith and morals of all the Councils (not
merely Ecumenical Councils, but Local Councils, as well
as a quantity of declarations of the Holy See from Clement
I, the third successor of St. Peter, to 1937, when Denzinger's
was first published) has less than 700 pages in a volume
one inch thick.
What does this mean?
Apparently nothing, but the volume of a discourse often
goes together with a lack of rigor of reasoning, and the
lack of precision of thought allows it to be interpreted
as one wishes. This in turn renders the Conciliar texts
unusable as doctrinal reference material, whereas consulting
Denzinger's on a doctrinal point always gives one a clear,
precise, and definitive answer-and precision and defmitiveness
were deliberately excluded at Vatican II. This is particularly
evident from Pope John XXIII's address at the opening of
the Council on October 11, 1962:
It is not a question
of condemnations and of repeating the doctrine which everyone
knows, we must pay no attention to the predictions of
prophets of doom. The Church must go forward... etc.
A strange suggestion,
which could be interpreted that for the Church to go forward
it must leave behind the doctrine which everyone knows.
The antithesis is clear: before/after; forward/behind. It
is easy to foresee objections to this line of interpretation
but, quite apart from the verbal dispute, isn't this the
reality of the situation? Does it not stare us in the face?
Do the "conciliar men" still have "doctrine
which everyone knows" ?-Yes, but only in their old
theology books which were closed and perhaps sold 30 years
ago.
The third
reason for amazement is Pope John XXIII's other
statement in his inaugural address: "Doctrine is one
thing-the formulation of the doctrine is another: it can
change." But, since one cannot present the doctrine
without its formulation, the formulation protects the orthodoxy
of the doctrine. The history of Councils shows us that the
champions of Catholic orthodoxy often fought for a single
word, and once this definitive formulation was found, it
was always held to be unchangeable.
If one takes the
route indicated by Pope John XXIII, however, it is easy
to arrive at a position that contradicts the irreformable
decisions of Vatican I (chap.IV, 31st session), which give
as a rule of Faith, that dogmas must be understood "eodem
sensu eademque sentential i.e., always in the same sense
in which they were held. Pope Pius X recalls this principle
in his Encyclical against Modernism, taking up Pope Pius
IX's Syllabus and his encyclical Qui Pluribus
(1846).3
Pope John XXIII's declaration is one indication, among many
others, of a modernist mentality; it signals the willingness
to break with Tradition.
The fourth (but not
the last) reason for amazement: while all the previous Councils
(except two-Chalcedon and Lyons) exhibit the rigorous form
of an exposition of the correct doctrine, followed by condemnation
of the opposite errors, Vatican II presents itself as a
collection of addresses, followed by recommendations, exhortations
and orientations, all without much precision. This has allowed
the documents to be twisted, at will, this way and that.
Mansuetus
Translated
by Graham Harrison, from Courrier de Rome, May
1998, pp.5-6.
1.
(Methuen, 1964), pp.227-228.
2.
Observer in Rome, p. 173
3.
Cf. Pascendi Dominid Gregis, Sept. 8, 1907.
Courtesy of the Angelus
Press, Kansas City, MO 64109
translated from the Italian
Fr. Du Chalard
Via Madonna degli Angeli, 14
Italia 00049 Velletri (Roma)
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